We study economies where all commodities are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the aggregate level of the economy. Under the survival assumption, we show that a competitive outcome in the discrete economy, called rationing equilibrium, converges to a Walras equilibrium of the limit economy when the level of indivisibility becomes small. If the survival assumption does not hold at the limit economy, then the rationing equilibrium converges to a hierarchic equilibrium.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate the asymptotic behaviour of competitive equilibria existing in economies when discrete consumption and production sets converge to convex sets, where all goods are perfectly divisible. Since a Walras equilibrium may fail to exist in the case of discrete consumption sets, we base our analysis on the framework proposed in Florig and Rivera [9] , using a continuum of agents and discrete consumption and production sets, so that goods are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the aggregate level of the entire economy. 1 Using a parameter called "fiat money" -whose solely role is to facilitate the exchange among individuals-and considering a regularized notion of demand, existence of a competitive equilibrium notion, called rationing equilibrium, can be established for these discrete economies. The set of rationing equilibria contains the set of Walras equilibria.
The nature of the limit of the equilibrium sequence will depend on the assumptions imposed on the limit economy. When the strong survival condition holds, then the limit of rationing equilibria will be a Walras equilibrium, 2 and therefore the indivisibility of goods becomes indeed irrelevant when it is small. The situation might be quite di↵erent when the initial endowment of resources of each consumer does not belong to the interior of the respective consumption set. In such case, the indivisibility of goods might matter, independently of how small it is. It may occur that not all consumers have access to all goods, i.e. a good may be so expensive that some consumers who do not own the expensive goods cannot buy a single unit by selling their entire initial endowment.
When the goods become "more divisible", i.e. if the minimal unit per good decreases, then the equilibrium price may react such that the situation persists.
Following Gay [10] , based on a generalized concept of price, several authors have proposed generalizations of the Walras equilibrium existing in the convex case even when the Walras equilibrium does not exist due to a failure of the strong survival assumption (Danilov and Sotskow [5] , Marakulin [13] , Mertens [14] , Florig [6] ). 3 Supported by several examples, Florig [6] proposes an interpretation of those generalized prices in terms of small indivisibilities. In the case of linear preferences, Florig [7] shows that a hierarchic equilibrium as proposed in [6] is the limit of standard competitive equilibria of economies with discrete consumption sets converging to the positive orthant. 4 We will show that rationing equilibria converge to a hierarchic equilibrium when the strong survival does not hold in the limit economy. This result formalises the interpretation of hierarchic equilibria in terms of small indivisibilities given in Florig [6] . In the absence of the strong survival assumption we may thus be in a situation where indivisibilities matter, independently how small the minimal tradable units of goods are. Note that a rationing equilibrium (with a positive price of fiat money) is a Walras equilibrium, provided that the initial endowment in fiat money is dispersed (Florig and Rivera [9] ). Therefore our result does not depend on the concept of rationing equilibrium.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some mathematical concepts that we use throughout this paper. In Section 3 we describe the model of discrete economies that approximate a standard economy, hence introducing a convergence concept for economies. In Section 4 we present conditions ensuring that the limit of a sequence of rationing equilibria is a Walras equilibrium (Proposition 4.1). In Section 5 we consider a more general framework, without 2 If local non-satiation of preferences does not hold the price of fiat money may however be positive at the limit. 3 When the consumption set is the positive orthant, the set of goods L is partitioned into several classes L1, . . . , L k according to their value, with any quantity of Lr goods buying infinite amounts of less valuable Lr+1, . . . , L k goods, buying other goods in Lr at standard prices, and finally any quantity of Lr goods cannot buy any positive quantity of more valuable L1, . . . , Lr 1 goods. 4 As local satiation cannot hold in the case of discrete consumption, dividend equilibria are employed.
a strong survival condition on the limit economy. In that case the limit of a sequence of rationing equilibrium is shown to be a hierarchic equilibrium.
Basic notation and preliminary concepts
In the following, 0 m is the origin of R m and x t is the transpose of x 2 R m , whose Euclidean norm is kxk. The inner product between x, y 2 R m is x · y = x t y, and the open ball with center x and radius " > 0 is B(x, "). For a couple of sets
Additionally, cl K 1 , int K 1 and conv K 1 denote, respectively, the closure, interior and the convex hull of K 1 . By denoting
we recall the outer limit of a sequence of subsets {K n } n2N of R m is the subset lim sup
while the inner limit is the set lim inf
We say that the sequence converges in the sense of Kuratowski -Painlevé to K ✓ R m if lim sup
and we denote lim
z} the accumulation points of {z n } n2N .
Economic model
By abuse of notation, we denote by L = {1, . . . , L}, I = {1, . . . , I} and J = {1, . . . , J} the finite sets of types of consumption goods, consumers and firms, respectively. We assume that each type of agent i 2 I and j 2 J corresponds to a continuum of identical individuals indexed by compacts subsets T i ⇢ R and T j ✓ R, pairwise disjoint. The set of consumers and firms is denoted by
respectively, and the type of producer t 2 J is j(t) 2 J, while the type of consumer t 2 I is i(t) 2 I.
In the following, each firm of type j 2 J is characterized by a production set Y j ⇢ R L , and the aggregate production set for firms of type j 2 J is the convex hull of (T j )Y j , where (·) is the standard Lebesgue measure in R. A production plan for a firm t 2 J is denoted y(t) 2 Y j(t) , and the set of admissible production plans is
Each consumer of type i 2 I is characterized by a consumption set X i ⇢ R L , an endowment of resources e i 2 R L and a strict preference correspondence
, and the set of admissible consumption plans is
The total initial resources of the economy is
] is the share of type i consumer's in type j firms. As usual, we assume for every j 2 J,
In addition, each consumer t 2 I is initially endowed with an amount m(t) 2 R + of fiat money, with m 2 L 1 (I, R + ). An economy E is a collection
and the feasible consumption-production plans of E are the elements of
We will now define supply, demand and the equilibrium concepts. Let p 2 R L , q 2 R and K is a pointed cone 5 of R L , whose family is denoted C L . Using them,
and
are, respectively, the profit, the Walras supply and the rationing supply of type j 2 J firms. 6 The income of consumer t 2 I is denoted by
and the budget set is
, and for which we also denote by
{⇠} ⇢ K the Walras, weak and rationing demand, respectively. 7
(a) (x, y, p, q) a Walras equilibrium with money of E if for a.e. t 2 I, x(t) 2 d t (p, q) and for a.e. t 2 J , y(t) 2 S j(t) (p), (c) (x, y, p, q) a weak equilibrium of E if for a.e. t 2 I, x(t) 2 D t (p, q) and for a.e. t 2 J , y(t) 2 S j(t) (p), (c) (x, y, p, q, K) a rationing equilibrium of E if for a.e. t 2 I, x(t) 2 t (p, q, K) and for a.e.
In order to define a sequence of discrete economies that approximates some economy E, in the sequel we will use given sequences
then converges in the sense of Kuratowski-Painlevé to R L .
Definition 3.2. We say that the sequence of economies {E n } n2N , with
6 The definition of the rationing supply we use here is less restrictive than in Florig and Rivera [8] . However, in the proofs of [8] it is only the requirement as imposed here which is used. 7 Using definition in (1), for t 2 I, we have Dt(p, q) = S
dt(pn, qn). As we will ensure that dt(·) is closed valued and locally bounded, by Theorem 5.19 in Rockafellar and Wets [15] , Dt(·) will be upper hemicontinuous while dt(·) may fail to be upper hemi-continuous. See Florig and Rivera [9] for more details.
approximates the economy E if for all n 2 N, i 2 I and j 2 J:
i is the restriction of P i to X n i .
Remark 3.1. The supply, demand and equilibrium concepts above defined for economy E can be readily adapted for economies E n , n 2 N. For that it is enough to replace Y j , X i and P i by Y n j , X n i and P n i in the corresponding definitions. The following assumptions will be used depending on the result to be established.
Assumption
Assumption M. m : I ! R + is bounded and for a.e. t 2 I, m(t) > 0.
Assumption SA. For all i 2 I e i 2 int
Assumption A. For all n 2 N, i 2 I and all j 2 J, X i = convX n i and Y j = convY n j .
Assumption F. For all i 2 I and each face F of X i such that 9 0
the sequence {F \ X n i } n2N converges in the sense of Kuratowski-Painlevé to F . Assumption F requires that X n i restricted to the a ne subspace for which the interiority assumption holds converges to X i restricted to that a ne subspace. This will be important to ensure that the budget set for a sequence of equilibria of the economies E n converges to a budget set of the economy E for some limit of the price sequence considered.
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Florig and Rivera [9] . For the proof it is enough to check that Assumption C on the economy E implies that the consumption and production sets of any economy of sequence {E n } n2N that approximates E are finite (i.e., the number of its elements is finite). The proposition ensures that the sequence of equilibria for which we study convergence do actually exist. Proposition 3.1. Suppose E satisfies Assumptions C, P, M and S, and let {E n } n2N be a sequence of economies approximating E. For each n 2 N, there exists a rationing equilibrium (x n , y n , p n , q n , K n ), with q n > 0.
Convergence under the Survival Assumption
In the next proposition, the survival assumption SA plays an important role in establishing the convergence to a Walras equilibrium. While this hypothesis is widely used, it is unrealistic, because it states that every consumer is initially endowed with a strictly positive quantity of every existing commodity. Typically, most consumers have a single commodity to sell (usually, their labor). In fact, it implies that all agents have the same level of income at equilibrium in the sense that they have all access to the same commodities.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose E satisfies Assumptions C, P, M and SA, and let {E n } n2N be a sequence of economies approximating E satisfying Assumption A. For each n 2 N, let (x n , y n , p n , q n ) be a weak equilibrium of E n , with q n > 0 and k (p n , q n ) k= 1. Then, there exists N 2 N ⇤ 1 , such that the following hold:
, such that for a.e. t 2 I, x ⇤ (t) 2 acc{x n (t)} n2N , and for a.e. t 0 2 J , y ⇤ (t 0 ) 2 acc{y n (t 0 )} n2N , with (x ⇤ , y ⇤ , p ⇤ , q ⇤ ) a Walras equilibrium with fiat money for E.
Moreover, if for a.e. t 2 I, x ⇤ (t) 2 cl P i(t) (x ⇤ (t)), then (x ⇤ , y ⇤ , p ⇤ ) is a Walras equilibrium for E Proof. First note that {E n } n2N approximating E implies that for all i 2 I, X n i converges to X i . By Assumption SA, the smallest face of X i containing 0
is X i , which implies that Assumption F is satisfied. Therefore, all the assumptions of Theorem 5.1 below are satisfied. Assumption SA implies that for a hierarchic equilibrium (x, y, P, Q) with
is a Walras equilibrium with fiat money (cf Florig [6] ). Moreover, if for a.e. t 2 I, x ⇤ (t) 2 cl P i(t) (x ⇤ (t)), then standard arguments imply that q 1 = 0.
The general case
We now replace assumption SA by a more realistic one, i.e. we will assume that every consumer could decide not to exchange anything. We will not assume however that he could survive for very long without exchanging anything. In such a case the limit of a sequence of rationing equilibria will not necessarily be a Walras equilibrium, it will be a hierarchic equilibrium, which is a competitive equilibrium with a segmentation of individuals according to their level of wealth. When this segmentation consists of just one group, the hierarchic equilibrium reduces to a Walras equilibrium.
In the following, vectors of R L are supposed to be columns, and for k 2 N, the matrix whose
Given that, a hierarchic price for consumption goods is P = [p 1 , . . . , p k ] t 2 R k⇥L , and the hierarchic value of ⇠ 2 R L is
Denoting by sup lex the supremum with respect to  lex , the lexicographic order 10 on R L , the hierarchic supply and the hierarchic profit of a firm of type j 2 J at P are
respectively, and given Q 2 R k + , the hierarchic budget set of consumer t 2 I is the set
. Definition 5.1. A collection (x, y, P, Q) 2 A(E) ⇥ R k⇥L ⇥ R k + is a "hierarchic equilibrium" of the economy E if:
(a) for a.e. t 2 J , y(t) 2 S j(t) (P), (b) for a.e. t 2 I, x(t) 2 B t (P, Q) and P i(t) (x(t)) \ B t (P, Q) = ;. The number k in above expressions will be determined at the equilibrium. When k = 1 then the hierarchic equilibrium becomes a Walras equilibrium with money. The next theorem, a generalization of Proposition 4.1, is the main result of this paper. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose E satisfies Assumptions C, P, M and S, and let {E n } n2N be a sequence of economies that approximates E and satisfying Assumptions A and F. For each n 2 N, let (x n , y n , p n , q n ) be a weak equilibrium of E n , with q n > 0 and k (p n , q n ) k= 1. Then, there exists a hierarchic equilibrium (x ⇤ , y ⇤ , P, Q) for economy E,
. . , L}, such that for some N 2 N ⇤ 1 the following hold:
, and for a.e. t 0 2 J , y ⇤ (t 0 ) 2 acc{y n (t 0 )} n2N .
Remark 5.1. As a rationing equilibrium is a weak equilibrium (see Definition 3.1), Theorem 5.1 remains valid when using a sequence of rationing equilibria instead of a sequence of weak equilibria as stated.
Appendix
For the proof of Theorem 5.1 we need some additional definitions and technical lemmata. The following lemma is proven in Florig and Rivera [9] .
Lemma 6.1. For every sequence : N ! R m \ {0 m } there are an integer k 2 {1, . . . , m}, N 2 N ⇤ 1 , a set of two-by-two orthonormal vectors { 1 , . . . , k } ✓ R m and sequences " r : N ! R ++ , r 2 {1, . . . , k}, such that the following hold:
(a) for all r 2 {1, . . . , k 1},
In the following, we say the collection {{ r , " r } r=1,...,k , N} is a lexicographic decomposition of { (n)} n2N , and for r 2 {0, . . . , k} we denote
Furthermore, for z 2 R m and r > 0, we also denote (r)z = ( 1 · z, . . . , k · z) t 2 R r , and for Z ✓ R m we set (r)Z = { (r)z | z 2 Z}.
The following lemmata refer to a sequence and lexicographic decomposition as in above lemma.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 6.2 were proven in Florig and Rivera [9] , while part (iii) is a direct corollary of part (ii) coupled with the observation that for any 2 R m and finite set of points
Lemma 6.2.
(i) For all z 2 R m there existsn 2 N such that for all n >n with n 2 N:
(ii) If Z ✓ R m is a finite set, then there existsn 2 N such that for all n >n with n 2 N:
(iii) If Z ✓ R m is a convex and compact polyhedron, then there existsn 2 N such that for all n >n with n 2 N:
Both parts (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 6.2 remain valid when replacing argmax lex by argmin lex .
Lemma 6.3. Let Z ⇢ R m be a convex and compact polyhedron, for which we define ⇢ = max r 2 {0, . . . , k}| min lex (r)Z = 0 max{1,r} and F = argmin lex (⇢)Z.
The following hold true.
(i) lim sup
with ⇤ (n) = 0 when = 0. By part (ii) in Lemma 6.2 there exists n 2 > n 1 such that for all
with b n = 0 if + 1 = k. By the fact that {z n } n2N remains in a compact set, there exists n 3 > n 2 such that for all n 2 N n 3 , on the one hand
and, on the other hand, since b n converges to zero,
Therefore, for all n 2 N n 3 ,
contradicting > 0, hence concluding the proof of part (i).
Part (ii). Letz 2 argmin lex (k)Z. By the fact that min lex (k)Z < lex 0 k , we have ⇢ < k and
and then
max{1,⇢} and therefore we have also
This coupled with the fact that ⇢ < k implies
where
with n = 0 if ⇢ + 1 = k. Given that, for all n 2 N, (⇢)z n = 0 max{1,⇢} , and as n converges to 0 and < 0, there existsn such that for all n 2 N with n >n, ↵ n < /2 and n < /4 and therefore ↵ n + n < /4 < 0. All of this implies that for all n 2 N with n >n,
and then, since the lim inf above is a closed set, 11 ⇣ 2 lim inf
Proof of Theorem 5.1
In the following, we use a sequence (x n , y n , p n , q n ) n2N of weak equilibria with q n > 0 of the economy E n (which exists by Proposition 3.1, considering that a rationing equilibrium is a weak equilibrium). For economy E n , the supply correspondence of type j 2 J firms is denoted S n j (·), while B n t (·) and D n t (·) denote the budget and weak demand correspondences for consumer t 2 I. 12 We can assume without loss of generality that for all t 2 I, x n (t) 2 D n t (p n , q n ) and all t 2 J , y n (t) 2 S n j (p n ). 13 The following proposition has been proven in Florig and Rivera [9] .
Step 1 . Hierarchic price.
Since k(p n , q n )k = 1, n 2 N, from Lemma 6.1 there exist
In the sequel, without loss of generality, we identify that subset N with N, and we denote
and for r 2 {1, . . . , k}, we set P(r) = [p 1 , . . . , p r ] t and Q(r) = (q 1 , . . . , q r ) t .
Step 2. Supply: For all t 2 J , lim sup
. As for all j 2 J, by Lemma 6.2 there exists n j 2 N such that for all n > n j ,
For all n 2 N and all j 2 J, convY n j = Y j , S n j (p n ) ✓ S j (p n ) = convS n j (p n ). This implies that for all n > n J = max{n j , j = 1, . . . , J}, and all t 2 J , S n j(t) (p n ) ✓ S j(t) (P) = convS n j(t) (p n ), hence concluding the proof of this Step.
Step 3. Income. For the sequel, for all j 2 J, let ⇣ j 2 argmax lex PY j , and for all i 2 I, we set
By
Step 2, for all t 2 I and all n > n J , w t (p n , q n ) = p n · z i(t) + q n m(t).
Step 4. Budget: For all t 2 I, lim sup
Furthermore, if m(t) > 0 then
Using z i from Step 3, the first inclusion is a straightforward consequence of part (i) of Lemma 6.3 applied to Z = X i(t) z i ⇥ { m(t)}. Indeed, note that for all n 2 N, n > n J , and all x 0 n (t) 2 B t (p n , q n ) we have n · z n  0 with z n = (x 0 n (t) z i(t) , m(t)) and (n) = (p n , q n ).
For the second inclusion, for t 2 I and n 2 N, we set ⇢ = max{r 2 {0, . . . , k} | min lex P(r)X i(t) = 0 max{1,r} } and F = min lex P(⇢)X i(t) .
Assumption S coupled with the observation m(t)Q > lex 0 k implies min lex P( X i(t) z i(t) m(t)Q < lex 0 k and m(t)Q(⇢) = 0 max{1,⇢} .
Therefore, producers profit maximization and assumption S implies 0 @ {e
By part (iii) of Lemma 6.2 we observe that F is a face of X i(t) , and then, by Assumption F it follows that lim n!1 X n i(t) \ F = X i(t) \ F. By part (ii) of Lemma 6.3
and since lim inf n!1 n x 2 X n i(t) \ F | p n · (x z i(t) ) < q n m(t) o ✓ lim inf n!1 n x 2 X n i(t) | p n · x < w t (p n , q n ) o the second inclusion holds true.
Step 5. Demand: For all t 2 I with m(t) > 0 and all x ⇤ (t) 2 acc{x n (t)} n2N we have
